In the existing literature, the 'virtual' nature of financial derivatives is often commented upon, but how these products are brought into being has seldom been examined in any depth. This article analyzes the development since 1970 of organized financial-derivatives trading in the U.S. and U.K. (in particular, of derivatives exchanges and of the British financial spread-betting industry), with the goal of examining the 'material production of virtuality'. The article explores the similarities and differences between technological innovation and innovation in derivatives; discusses the role of the 'internal' cultures of financial markets and of the wider culture (in particular, the legal traces of hostility to gambling); and analyzes the requirement of 'facticity' for the measure underlying a cash-settled derivative, focusing in particular on the most important such measure, British Bankers' Association LIBOR (London interbank offered rate).
A dominant feature of the massive changes in global financial markets since 1970 has been the huge growth in trading of financial derivatives: contracts or securities the value of which depends on the price of another 'underlying' security or on the level of an index, an exchange rate or an interest rate. The financial-derivatives trading that existed at the start of the 1970s was limited in volume by today's standards, and was primarily ad hoc, conducted either in the interstices and/or on the fringes of stock markets, or else 'over-the-counter': by direct negotiation, especially between banks.
In January 1970, no organized financial-derivatives exchange existed anywhere in the world.
At the end of June 2006, exchange-traded derivatives totalling $84.4 trillion (the equivalent of around $13,000 for every human being on Earth) were outstanding worldwide, and the total was growing fast, having increased roughly six-fold over the previous eight years (figure 1). Many of these contracts will have been entered into to offset the risks of other derivatives (so an unknown proportion of the total is thus in a sense self-cancelling), but the change from 1970 is nonetheless striking.
Economists have focused primarily on the pricing of derivatives, although there is a more 'institutional' literature in economics on financial innovation (see Tufano 2003) and some useful work on why some derivatives succeed and others fail (e.g., Black 1986) . Recently, the attention paid to derivatives by human geographers, anthropologists and sociologists has increased sharply: see, for example, Tickell (1998 & 2000) , Pryke and Allen (2000) , Maurer (2001 Maurer ( & 2002 , LiPuma and Lee (2004 & and Arnoldi (2004) .
A common theme in this more sociological literature is 'the strangely imaginary ... or virtual character of derivatives' (Arnoldi 2004: 23) . All financial securities are 'virtual' in the sense that their value lies not in their physical substance as paper certificates or entries in an electronic database but in the claims on future states of the world that they embody: rights to dividends from a corporation, to interest payments from a government, and so on. A derivative of such a security is thus an entity that derives its value from what is already an abstract claim, and so the development of derivatives markets can be seen as a further stage of the abstraction of monetary forms. Derivatives are 'money's "new imaginary"', note Pryke and Allen (2000) .
This article focuses not on the overall nature of derivatives (a dominant concern of much of the existing literature) but on how 'abstract' or 'virtual' assets are brought into being and made tradeable. As the developments in computer technology (above all, 'virtual memory') 1 that have given us the modern notion of 'virtuality' remind us, virtuality is always a material effect, indeed an elaborate, sophisticated and expensive one. More generally, it is clear that 'immateriality can only be expressed through materiality ' (Miller 2005: 28) .
To be sure, one should not reduce materiality to physicality alone. The materiality of financial markets involves physical objects, technological systems and human bodies, but also the legal systems, cultures, procedures, beliefs and social relations that objects and bodies express, make possible, are shaped by, and are enmeshed in. Financial derivatives, abstract though they appear, are particular material configurations (with 'material' read in this broad sense).
However, 'the material production of virtuality' -the way in which those configurations are brought into being, shaped and sustained -has received scant attention in the geographical, anthropological or sociological literature on derivatives (one of the few exceptions is Millo, Muniesa, Panourgias and Scott 2005) . In order to help correct this, I explore three issues. The first is the parallels (and also the dissimilarities) between financial and technological innovation. This theme is in the literature in economics (e.g. Silber 1981 ), but the view of technological innovation to be found there is too narrow, excluding for example its political dimension. Viewing derivatives as innovations offers a perspective on the 'performativity' of economics (Callon 1998 and MacKenzie and Millo 2003; MacKenzie 2004) and highlights issues such as the intellectual property regime within which innovation takes place and the need, if innovation is to be successful, to take into account the interests of intended 'users' and to find a workable compromise between incompatible interests.
The second issue to be explored is the 'cultural geographies' (Thrift 2000) The third issue to be discussed is 'facticity'. The virtual character of a derivative contract is enhanced if, as is increasingly the case, it can be settled only by the transfer of cash, with neither party able to demand or impose delivery of an underlying asset. The measure used to determine the amounts to be paid must therefore be a 'fact': it must be an acceptable representation of the reality of which it speaks, and not be subject to manipulation. I focus in particular on how this is achieved for the most important set of facts of this kind: LIBOR, London interbank offered rate.
The article's main empirical focus is the development of financial-derivatives exchanges in the U.S. and U.K. since 1970 and the emergence of the British financial spread-betting industry. The specificity of exchanges and of spread betting builds into the study a bias towards the discovery of heterogeneity: national differences in overthe-counter trading almost certainly exist, but would be harder to identify. That bias, however, is balanced by the choice of the U.S. and U.K. as comparator countries. In analyzing these developments, the article draws upon four sets of sources.
The first is existing histories of the Chicago Board of Trade (Falloon 1998) , Chicago
Mercantile Exchange (Tamarkin 1993; Melamed and Tamarkin 1996) and LIFFE (Kynaston 1997 These economists in the wild did not simply 'apply' economics. They found themselves involved in processes of innovation that involved close interaction with the three main categories of users of derivatives: hedgers, who are concerned to protect their organizations against a risk such as currency or interest-rate fluctuations;
speculators, who hope to profit by correctly anticipating those fluctuations; and market makers, who stand ready both to buy and to sell the product in question, earning the difference between the 'bid' and the 'ask' (the prices at which they are prepared to buy and to sell).
Hedging, speculating and market making are categories of activity rather than of people and organizations: market makers, for example, often hedge their positions or deliberately take speculative positions, while some well-publicized derivatives fiascos have resulted from organizations starting out by hedging but slipping into speculating. Nevertheless, the categories of 'hedger' and 'speculator' are part of the 'lay sociology' that participants in derivatives exchanges deploy, and 'market maker' is a designated role with specific responsibilities.
Innovative exchange-traded derivatives need to be shaped in such a way as to be attractive to all three categories of user. The potential for interests to conflict, even after they have been elicited and 'translated' (Latour 1987) in this way, makes contract design -like technological design (Winner 1980) -an inherently political problem. It is one that cannot be solved simply by fiat (overly favouring the interests of one group will likely be fatal, because others will then not participate in trading), but requires balance and compromise. Richard Sandor, for example, noted that the delivery procedure he designed for the Chicago Board of Trade's first financial derivative, futures on mortgage-backed bonds, 'is complicated and cumbersome. It appears to cause difficulties for both the longs and the shorts. It is in that sense fair, and may be the reason it has been successful' (Sandor and Sosin 1983: 267) .
Design, marketing and the encouragement (often via face-to-face meetings) of participation are pressing matters, especially in the early days of a new contract, because exchange-traded derivatives are subject to 'virtuous' and 'vicious' circles akin to those identified in technological innovation by Arthur (1984) and David (1992) . The archetypal example is the QWERTY keyboard. It is not demonstrably optimal for electronic word-processing -its original motivation was to reduce the chances of the levers of a mechanical typewriter sticking together by minimizing the frequency with which adjacent keys were struck in succession -but QWERTY is 'locked in' to the English-speaking world's keyboards, and its rivals 'locked out':
none has a realistic chance of displacing it.
Lock-in results from the advantages that sometimes flow to an incumbent technology or derivatives exchange simply by virtue of being incumbent.
QWERTY's advantages are the familiarity of millions of users with that key-lay and the difficulties they would face in the first few weeks of using a different layout. The internal combustion engine's advantages include the century of intensive research and development effort that has been devoted to it (and not to its rivals), and the huge infrastructure of fuel supply and maintenance that a rival would have to create afresh.
In the case of derivatives exchanges, business tends to flow to where existing volumes of trading are high, because high volumes mean liquidity (even large transactions can be conducted quickly, easily, and without a large impact on price), low transaction costs and a robust market price. Conversely, low volumes mean illiquidity, high costs and unreliable prices. So an exchange that gains an established position in a particular derivative becomes, like QWERTY, hard to challenge (Silber 1981: 132) . LIFFE, for example, found that the currency futures it launched in competition with those of Chicago Mercantile Exchange were not successful, despite
London's overall prominent role in foreign exchange (Kynaston 1997: 95-96 and 126-27; Leslie and Wyatt 1992: 91) . Instead, LIFFE's survival and success came to rest on derivatives that had no well-established rivals, notably FTSE-100 futures and U.K.
and German bond futures.
There are, however, also differences between financial and most technological innovation. The tax treatment of derivatives is more critical to their success than in the case of most physical technologies. For example, the appeal of the London Traded Options Market to customers was initially limited by the way in which options were treated until September 1980 in U.K. tax law as 'wasting assets', which had the consequence that capital gains tax liabilities could be incurred on loss-making as well as on profitable trading (Steen 1982) . In contrast, a large part of the appeal of financial spread betting is that in the U.K. customers' winnings are free from tax.
Spread-betting firms incur tax liabilities as bookmakers, but these are modest and absorbed into the spread between the prices at which the firms buy and sell contracts.
Financial innovations are easier to 'reverse engineer' than most technologies (Tufano 1989: 230; Allen and Gale 1994: 53) . To minimize the risk of dispute and litigation, the specification of derivatives has to be made as explicit as possible.
Trading derivatives, pricing them and hedging their risks may require tacit knowledge, but their design is easy to copy. Innovative technologies (especially those that are easily copied, such as pharmaceuticals) are protected from imitation by intellectual property law, particularly patenting. In contrast, the legal protection of innovative financial products (and, for example, derivatives pricing models) has been limited, at least until very recently. In the U.S., for example, financial products and models were presumed to fall within the 'business method' and/or 'mathematical algorithm'
exemptions from the possibility of patenting. The general shift of intellectual property law from a presumption of open access -to which patents were the exception -towards a presumption in favour of private property (Merges 2000 Street sought to appeal to the Supreme Court, but in January 1999 the latter denied it leave to do so (Lerner 2002: 903) .
It is remarkable that, at least until State Street, financial derivatives, central as they are to the global capitalist system, developed in a legal regime with only limited intellectual property rights. Did that regime (a) slow innovation by reducing incentives, or (b) enhance innovation by facilitating copying and adaptation in a context in which QWERTY-like 'first mover' advantages were an adequate incentive?
That question points to a familiar debate about patenting that cannot be entered into here, but the extraordinary pace of derivatives innovation might incline one to (b).
What is, however, clear is that copying was indeed easy. Specific derivatives have frequently been imitated without, at least until recently, fear of litigation. IG Index would, likewise, have been unable to prevent other firms offering analogous spreadbetting contracts. Indeed, there is a sense in which entire exchanges have been imitated. LIFFE, for example, was more closely modelled on the Chicago exchanges, particularly the Mercantile Exchange, than on any British precedent (Kynaston 1997; Leslie and Wyatt 1992: 91) .
Cultural Geography
The establishment of LIFFE highlights a theme prominent in ethnographies such as Abolafia (1996) There was an even greater gulf between Chicago's rough and tumble and the 'gentlemanly capitalism' (Thompson 1997 at Union Jack jackets, fearing they 'would be seen on television selling the pound down the river' [Kynaston 1997: 73] .) LIFFE's traders were often defiantly East End or 'Essex boys' (Zaloom 2003 and rather than gentlemen.
The London Traded Options Market (LTOM) was far more ambivalently placed than LIFFE. Its inspiration too was Chicago (in its case, the success of the Chicago Board Options Exchange, although the immediate spur to its establishment was the threat that options on London shares might be traded in Amsterdam), but LTOM's London Stock Exchange parentage was too strong for it fully to embrace the more flamboyant aspects of Chicago trading culture. One market maker who moved from Chicago to LTOM in 1986 recalls that he 'was booed off the floor first day because I had brown shoes on'. His colleagues were no doubt teasing, but he found the attempt to translate Chicago attitudes and practices to London sometimes uncomfortable.
Tracing the economic consequences of differences of this kind is difficult.
The spreads between LTOM's market makers' 'bid' and 'ask' prices in the late 1970s
and early 1980s were large (Gemmill and Dickins 1986) , far bigger than those in Trading of futures on physical commodities and of stock options passed the intent test (stock options could be settled by handing over share certificates, and that had come to count as delivery). However, the test created problems for more sophisticated financial derivatives precisely because of their more abstract nature. A stock index, for example, is a mathematical abstraction (it is not the price of any single entity, but is an average of prices), so by far the simplest way to construct a future on an index is to make it settleable by cash payment alone. But claiming intent to deliver would then be impossible, and the contract would as a result be liable to be ruled to be a wager. 'long' having the right to demand delivery of a deposit similar to a loan in the interbank market (the market that LIBOR 'summarizes' in the way discussed below).
In July 1982, LIFFE obtained Counsel's opinion that 'such a contract is not a wager in law' (Kynaston 1997: 58) . In 1984, a similar hybrid was devised for LIFFE's new FTSE-100 futures, with 'buyers and sellers [able to] nominate shares they might wish to receive or deliver', again because of the fear that 'Gaming Act implications might preclude cash-only settlement' (Kynaston 1997: 131) .
The issue of gambling was resolved decisively in the U.K. only in 1986, when, Kynaston reports, LIFFE's 'traditionally good relationship ' (1997: 155) with the Department of Trade and Industry led to the inclusion in the Financial Services Act of a provision (section 63) laying down that no contract that constituted investment business within the meaning of the Act could be rendered 'void or unenforceable' on the grounds that it was a wager. The provision removed the barrier to derivatives that could be settled only in cash. They might still fail the intent test and thus be classed as bets, but they were now legally enforceable.
The 1986 provision had, however, an inadvertent consequence: it rescued the nascent British spread-betting industry (which has subsequently grown to compete with LIFFE for the business of individual customers) from the consequences of the 1987 stock market crash. Because gambling remained legal in the U.K., IG Index had been able to turn the analogy between derivatives trading and gambling from a problem (as it had been in the U.S. and for LIFFE) into a resource: making a derivative into a bet confers the tax advantage noted above.
The standardized contracts that IG Index and its competitors offer their customers are analogous to futures (the main difference is that the contracts are directly with the spread-betting firm, rather than between customers). In the case of FTSE-100 contracts, for example, firms quote a price at which customers can 'buy' the index, and a lower price at which they can 'sell' it. (As with market makers on exchanges, the firms' profits come mainly from the spread between the two prices.) A customer who believes the index will rise will buy the index, staking a certain amount (typically of the order of £5) per index point, hoping that the index will have risen by more than the spread by the time he or she sells the index back to the firm. A customer who believes the index will fall will begin by selling the index, and close the bet by buying (see, e.g., Vintcent 2002).
As with exchange-traded futures, spread bets thus offer the potential that a limited initial 'margin' deposit can become a much larger gain or loss. Spread-betting firms hedge any large resultant exposure to market movements by taking a position similar to that taken by the aggregate of their customers (often using futures on LIFFE or other exchanges). Until 1986, however, it was impossible legally to recover sums customers owed the firm. IG Index controlled that risk by requiring a deposit large enough to cover likely losses, but calculating that deposit involved estimating the size of plausible market movements; demanding too big a deposit would put customers off.
As noted in MacKenzie (2004), the 1987 crash involved a market move far greater than seemed likely, and it left many of IG Index's customers with liabilities exceeding their deposits. At that time, the firm was nowhere near as well-financed as it is today and it could easily have become insolvent. Because its customers were in aggregate 'long', it too was long, and huge price declines meant it owed large sums to its brokers, which had to be paid immediately. However, many of its customers (who thought they knew gambling debts to be unenforceable) refused, or were unable, to pay what they owed IG Index. Fortunately from its viewpoint, IG Index was able to point them to section 63 of the Financial Services Act, which meant they had to pay 
Facticity
'Culture' is thus not simply 'the context' within which derivatives trading takes place.
Via matters such as the law of gambling, it shapes and is intermeshed with the detailed mechanics of this trading. Another crucial aspect of those mechanics is the nature of the asset or rate underlying a derivative.
For agricultural futures exchanges -which were, as noted, the sites from which modern financial-derivatives exchanges sprung -the most pressing issue in this respect was standardizing the underlying asset to an extent sufficient for claims on it to be tradeable without reference to any specific physical entities. In Chicago grain trading, standardization seems to have been an emergent property, co-evolving with futures trading (Cronon 1991 and 'the exchange's most successful contract ever' (Falloon 1998: 251 ; the fine ethnography by Zaloom 2006 is of the Board of Trade's bond-futures trading). Bonds themselves could not plausibly be standardized, so in both cases the tricky problem of making different issues of bonds commensurable had to be tackled. The solutions found were a little elaborate but robust, though sudden shortages of the 'cheapest-todeliver' bond (sometimes the result of a deliberate 'squeeze') are a recurrent problem of which all bond-derivatives traders must be wary.
A derivatives contract that can be settled only in cash avoids such problems, and cash settlement also facilitates the development of derivatives on entities that cannot straightforwardly be delivered: first of all stock indexes, and now a much wider range of entities including, for example, weather and human longevity. However, cash settlement raises a difficulty of a different sort (one quite distinct from the legal vulnerability arising from the 'intent test'). The measure used to determine cash settlement sums -whether it be a price, an index level, an interest rate or a measurement of weather, longevity or other entity -must be a fact.
One aspect of facticity is adequacy of representation. The measure used for cash settlement must be believed genuinely to express conditions in the market or process underlying the derivative, so that someone using the derivative to hedge risk can be sure that (if conditions are unfavourable) the gain they will make from the derivative will cancel out the losses they will incur in the underlying market or from the underlying process.
Problems of adequacy of representation may, for example, have been one factor in the failure of the London Futures and Options Exchange's property futures (Patel 1994) . The measure used for its housing futures was the Nationwide Anglia house price index, but that was based only on transactions in which Nationwide
Anglia was the lender. It was only one of several candidate measures of the overall state of the U.K. housing market (even today, different indexes often offering markedly different estimates of the rate of change in house prices). Furthermore, the average countrywide condition of the housing market was less relevant to hedgerssuch as developers concerned that the houses they were building would not fetch the To understand how LIBOR is constructed requires a brief discussion of the interbank market. A key role in it is played by 'voice brokers'. Such brokers sit at desks in rooms that resemble banks' trading rooms, but are more crowded, noisier and more raucous. On each broker's desk is a 'voice box' (consisting of a microphone, loudspeaker and switches), which is connected by a dedicated telephone line to a similar voice box at the desks of each of the broker's clients in bank dealing rooms.
Sometimes interbank deals are struck directly, but more often a bank's dealer who wishes to place or to receive an interbank deposit will use his or her voice box to tell a broker, who will then do one of three things: (a) use his or her voice box to try to find a counterparty; (b) shout out the order to his or her colleagues; or (c) ask a 'board boy' (as they are still called) to write the order on one of the large whiteboards that surround the brokers' desks.
Brokers supply their bank dealing-room clients with screens that indicate current bid and offer rates for interbank deposits, and those screens are the most important minute-by-minute representation of the interbank market. There is, however, an element of judgement in the rates that brokers display on the screens.
Not all banks are equal: their credit ratings differ, and a bank's credit risk department will typically impose a limit on the amount of money that can be on deposit with any particular counterparty bank. So a broker may, for example, choose not to display the most attractive interest rate that he or she knows of, if its source is a bank with a poor credit rating to which many of his or her clients would be unable to lend. you'll probably have three aggressive lenders, so the run-through you get from the broker is where you're going to get the first three lots of money.
After that you have to move your price up until it becomes attractive enough for the people that don't want to lend to suddenly think, 'well, this is becoming attractive enough to do it', and that's where this spread ... comes from ...[A LIBOR estimate is] not going to be a mid-market rate, it's going to be the point at which you are likely to get the money.
The judgement thus involved in estimating LIBOR raises another aspect of the facticity of the measure used to cash-settle a derivative: its robustness in respect to attempts to manipulate it. Those with no direct involvement in the market of which it LIBOR is a representation might be guaranteed to be unbiased, but they would lack the detailed knowledge needed to exercise informed judgement, so there is no practical alternative to reliance on those who may have 'interests' in the outcome. Melamed, then chair of the exchange, but 'the beauty of the [LIBOR] "fixing" was that it was so overwhelmingly accepted as the "true" price for interest rates'. 'reputation', 'scale of activity in the London market' and 'perceived expertise in the currency concerned', while 'giving due consideration to credit standing' (Mason 1999: 3-4 deliberately not defined exactly (Mason 1999: 4-5 , emphases in original) -and from those inputs it produces almost unequivocal facts. The fixing's elegance is that it is sociologically robust, so to speak. The banks that produce the inputs will very likely have large derivatives portfolios indexed to British Bankers' Association LIBOR, the value of which will be affected by the final figure, but as well as the latter their inputs are also disseminated. An idiosyncratic, manipulative input would thus be on public display to the market. Furthermore, the exclusion of the top and bottom quartiles means that an overly idiosyncratic input would in any case be thrown out of the calculation.
LIBOR is of course a social-kind (Barnes 1983) , performative fact: it is the output of the above process. The one significant issue about its facticity has concerned not the integrity of the process but its output's representativeness. As worries grew in the 1990s over the creditworthiness of Japanese banks, the rates at which they could borrow increased with respect to their western counterparts. Their inputs into the LIBOR calculation rose accordingly. In panels with only one or two Japanese banks, that would simply place them in the top quartile and outside the averaging process, but, for example, in 1999 seven of the 16 banks in the yen panel were Japanese.
Concern surfaced about the impact on LIBOR of the 'yen premium' -or, viewed from a Japanese perspective, 'the European discount' (Mason 1999: 6) . Wholesale removal of Japanese banks from the LIBOR panels would have been a very damaging vote of no-confidence, but the need for such a measure was avoided by the gradual stabilization of the Japanese banking system and the introduction of netting agreements that reduced the exposure of counterparties to a bank failure.
Conclusion
The more theoretically-oriented of the contributions to the geographical, anthropological and sociological literature on financial derivatives have had a tendency inadvertently to replicate the appearance of the products they discuss: they have formed a rather abstract literature on apparently abstract products. However, a market in these products 'is more than a bright idea', says Leo Melamed, who led the Chicago Mercantile Exchange's move into financial derivatives. 'It takes planning, calculation, arm-twisting, and tenacity to get a market up and going. Even when it's chugging along, it has to be cranked and pushed' (Melamed and Tamarkin 1996: 295) .
In emphasizing that calculation, cranking and pushing (for some insight into 1 Most computer systems employ both fast 'main memory' (the contents of which programs can access and modify), which in the early years of computing was expensive and limited in its capacity, and 'secondary storage', which is slower, not directly accessible but larger-capacity. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, computer scientists learned how to design operating systems that automatically transfer data between the two in such a way as to free programs from the limited physical capacity of main memory by giving them access to an 'address space' ('virtual memory') that is much larger.
